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‘The demand for justice is an emancipatory one, which has been described 
with terms such as fairness, reciprocity, symmetry, equality or balance; 
reflexively, this demand is grounded in the claim to be respected […] as a 
being who can give and demand justifications. Not the person who lacks 
certain goods but the person who does not ‘count’ in the production and 
distribution of goods is the primary victim of injustice.’ (10, my trans-
lation) 
This quote from the introduction of Rainer Forst’s recent collection of 
essays from the period 1999-2007 can be read as a brief summary of what 
the collection is about. First, Forst argues that justice is an emancipatory 
and moral ideal that expresses the equal dignity of persons in a special 
way. Second – and this is the main message of the book – he argues that 
this dignity is to be understood in terms of persons’ capacity to give and 
demand justificatory reasons for convictions and actions that they and 
those acting on them have or undertake. Finally, in practical matters, this 
leads to the conclusion that injustices are never just about the presence or 
absence of certain states of affairs, but rather about persons’ status as legis-
lators of the rules and authorities they fall under. 
That said, it has to be stressed that Forst’s thought goes much further 
than one may at first sight expect from an exercise in thinking through 
our status as moral legislators. Forst is not just a Kantian moral theorist; 
he is a Critical Theorist working in the tradition of Jürgen Habermas as 
well. His theory is in the end as much a critique of interpersonal power 
relations as it is a positive account of morality. This makes Forst’s work 
attractive, passionate, and in many ways convincing: his critique of power 
relations by which victims of injustice are robbed of the very possibility to 
demand for a justification gives his conception of morality both a concre-
teness and an acuteness that makes his central notion of the right to 
justification stick. After reading the collection, I am convinced that we 
have such a right, even though I don’t accept Forst’s exact argument for 
it. But perhaps that is not so important, what is important is that the 
notion itself convinces. 
The book starts with a first part on fundamental questions in practical 
philosophy about practical reason, morality and justice. This is followed 
by a second part on political and social justice in nation states and a third 
and final part on human rights and transnational justice. The book gives 
us a good sense of Forst’s developing work over the last ten years. I cannot 
possibly give a comprehensive review of the book in just a couple of pages. 
I will discuss at some length the theoretical account of morality that he 
develops in the first part and look at its consequences for what he calls a 
critical theory of transnational justice as developed in the third part. 
 
The right to justification 
So what is this right to justification? In his introduction, Forst states that 
it: 
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‘articulates the demand, that there should be no political and social power 
constellations that cannot be adequately justified to those affected by 
them. Irrespective of the specific and ‘thick’ situated language [a] protest is 
phrased in, in essence it always goes back on the claiming of the right not 
to be subjected to laws, structures or institutions that are ‘groundless’, i.e. 
that can be understood as an expression of insufficiently justified power. ‘ 
(10, my translation) 
The idea of a basic right to justification is as attractive as it is simple. 
Everyone with a sufficiently developed sense of morality, social relations 
and politics will readily agree that the practice of protest, of critique, of 
saying ‘no’ to the powers that be in some sense or other presupposes a 
freedom or capacity to ask for a justification. ‘Why do you do this to me?’ 
and ‘Why this law rather than that, why this formulation of it rather than 
the other?’ are questions we all have posed. They have at least two 
meanings: we demand a factual explanation – what has caused your doing 
this to me? What has caused your supporting this law rather than that? – 
and we demand a moral justification – why do you think that what you 
did or chose was justified? And: if you cannot justify this act or choice to 
me, then take it back, repair it, compensate me for the damage you have 
done. To the extent that we believe that we should always have the 
freedom to ask for a justification we can indeed speak of a right to 
justification, i.e. a justified social claim for a justification backed up by 
moral insight and possibly political power. 
In a long and thorough first chapter on the foundation of morality, Forst 
introduces the reader to the details of his account of practical reason, 
motivating and justificatory reasons, and ultimately morality. He starts 
with a reflection on practical reason. This he sees, in a Kantian vein, as the 
capacity to answer practical questions with justifying reasons in ways that 
fit with the practical contexts in which they arise (31). Practical ‘contexts’ 
such as law, morality, politics and ethics (of the good life) all have their 
own criteria of justification. Yet in his first chapter, Forst concentrates on 
the moral context and its justificatory aspects. He does not so much 
demonstrate but starts from the Kantian assumption that the dignity of 
the human subject lies in its capacity to give itself the law in practical 
matters and that the moral law is the only law that has a status that is 
binding unconditionally. This approach sits a little uneasily with the claim 
that the chapter offers a recursive reconstruction of what it means to act 
and judge in moral contexts. Forst does not so much analyse contexts of 
moral action; he rather discusses literature that has genuinely offered 
rational reconstructions of moral action: Kant, Habermas, Korsgaard and 
others. Against the background of a thorough discussion of this literature 
Forst discusses some of the main questions in meta-ethics and the theory 
of action that we know from the literature: What is practical reason? What 
is justification through practical reasoning? How do justifying reasons 
relate to motivating ones? What is the practical ground of morality as seen 
from a first-person perspective, i.e. how can morality really become 
practical? 
The upshot of the first chapter is the following position on practical 
reason and justificatory reasons: The ‘context of morality’ demands of 
persons that they give reasons for their actions that every moral person 
will respect, ‘even in cases where those concerned do not share a further 
ethical or political context’ (32). Morality is, in other words, autonomous. 
Its norms and principles, its liberties, rights and duties can be understood 
by every moral person. Indeed, as we will see, following moral norms for 
reasons external to morality, i.e. instrumental or eudaemonistic reasons, 
disqualifies that act as moral. Morality is not just about the consequences, 
it is about the right motivation and judgment as well. 
Forst claims that in moral contexts the validity claim of a norm about x is 
always that every person has the duty to x or to refrain from x (33). If the 
norm is valid, then no-one has reason not to obey it. The general 
principle of reasonable justification is a principle of reciprocal-universal 
justification (34). And this justification should be understood as a 
discursive practice rather than a test of the will in foro interno (35).  
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Forst defends an intersubjective and performative understanding of 
morality. Yet, it remains somewhat unclear to me what that means 
exactly. In order for the quality of an intersubjective practice of 
justification to be safeguarded, it is of tantamount importance that per-
sons have learned to reflect on the needs, interests and viewpoints of the 
other. It is true that one learns this best in intersubjective practices. Yet it 
also is true that such practices run best when some individuals show true 
excellence in the form of deliberation; they know how to make a moral 
judgment and may be thought of as moral exemplars. Good parents are 
like that; good moral and political leaders are like that. And apart from 
this, in many situations that call for moral justification not all concerned 
have an effective voice. Moral paternalism is a case in point: legitimate 
forms of moral paternalism illustrate how we come to a judgement for 
the other when genuine justificatory intersubjectivity on a course of 
action is impossible. All in all this seems more than enough reason to 
doubt whether moral justification should always be seen as a fully 
intersubjective process. I would have liked to see some more thought 
devoted to the question of how the moral importance of intersubjective 
exchange relates to the empirical circumstance that in morally pressing 
cases, such relations tend to be at risk. 
Be that as it may if we assume that Forst’s overall argument up to this 
point is valid he has succeeded in a basic but impressive argument for the 
right to justification. ‘According to the principle of reciprocal-universal 
justification moral persons have a fundamental right to justification – and 
an accompanying unconditional duty to justification of morally relevant 
actions. This right lends every moral person a veto-right against actions 
and norms that cannot be morally justified.’ (36)  
 
 
 
Practical reasons for morality 
Forst stresses that an account of a fundamental moral right is not worth 
much if it cannot be made clear how justified reasons can be practical 
reasons, i.e. reasons that motivate persons to moral action. He claims that 
moral action is different from action that  merely conforms to moral 
norms in that it is motivated by moral reasons; reasons that all could will, 
or rather would accept in intersubjective deliberation. Insight into 
justifying reasons is a practical reason for action as well. Here, in an 
exchange with and critique of Bernard Williams’ well-known reflections 
on the subject of internal and external reasons, Forst argues that merely 
subjective desires cannot ground moral validity because, as merely 
subjective desires, they cannot be defended in light of the criteria of 
reciprocity and universality. Contra Williams he argues that there is no 
such thing as an agent-relative moral motivation because moral 
motivation is by definition shareable by all moral subjects. Real moral 
action is not just acting in conformity with moral rules and insights, it is 
action from insight into the moral correctness of the moral thing to do. 
Self-interested reasons or reasons born from a particular conception of 
the good life (i.e., a religious, humanistic, or cultural conception of the 
good life for the human animal) are external to morality and cannot 
count as moral motivations. Forst acknowledges that this strict view 
about moral motivation is a problem for Kantian morality. Yet, he claims 
to have an answer to it: the right and at the same time practically effective 
kind of moral motivation is found in the unconditional claim for moral 
respect and responsibility with regard to the both morally capable and 
morally vulnerable other. In those who already acknowledge the correct-
ness of the moral law, a confrontation with the moral claims of the other 
will ‘trigger’ the required cognitive, volitive and affective aspects of the 
moral disposition. Respecting – or, as Forst says towards the end of the 
first chapter, recognizing – a person as an end in itself is to respect her 
right to justification in practical situations. 
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Forst stresses that this is in a way an ‘either you see it or you don’t’ 
account of morality. Towards the end of the first chapter he illustrates 
this with references to philosophers of practice such as Stanley Cavell and 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, who both in their own way are known for stressing 
that pragmatic attitudes precede theoretical reflection on possible 
grounds for such attitudes. You either know how to play the game, how 
to acknowledge the other in his or her humanity, or you don’t. If you 
have to ask, then you don’t know. But these references leave a huge 
question open. For these philosophers typically are not constructing 
general theories of morality but carefully describe multiple practices and 
attitudes, among which moral ones figure and will vary depending on the 
practice described. A Cavellian or Wittgensteinian analysis of morality 
would describe various aspects of moral practices, such as forms of care, of 
justification, and of disagreement, and let them exist along side each 
other. As a question, as it were. The analysis would most certainly not 
result in the theoretical articulation of a fundamental right underlying all 
these various aspects of moral practice. Indeed, these authors are known 
for their resistance to the idea that the multiplicity of social practices can 
be accounted for theoretically in terms of an ultimate ground. 
One of the main points of Cavellian or Wittgensteinian understandings of 
moral acknowledgement is that if you are well-embedded in a practice 
you know what to do or how to judge without much thought. Moral 
insight does not precede moral action, so to speak. The kind of insight 
required is itself a practical rather than a theoretical kind of knowledge. It 
is hyperdependent on context and not to be thought of as grasping a 
general rule that can be applied to a specific case. Forst does not really 
escape that picture of morality, however. To him, having a practical 
reason for action is recognizing the other as someone whose right to 
justification should be answered in light of one’s moral duty to – respect 
that right. 
Axel Honneth, Forst’s Frankfurt colleague, has recently held the 
following against Forst’s account of the sources of morality and moral 
emancipation: ‘I find it highly implausible to conceive of this idea of [equal 
autonomy for all persons] as a serendipitous endowment that all past 
social actors possessed from the moment of birth. People aren’t born into 
the world as little Kantians, but as competent infants who possess all the 
capabilities they need to grow into – and perhaps even out of – the moral 
world constituted by their surroundings. Their parents, for their part, 
behave like Aristotelians, and assume their children to have all the 
potentials that they will need, along with the proper care and upbringing, 
to mature into morally competent adults.’1 In other words: in giving an 
account of the practical ground of morality it is not enough to stress the 
importance of the capacity for moral insight. The capacity to act from this 
practical ground of morality has to be brought out in practice, through 
upbringing, education and self-development so that one gradually comes 
to recognize the instances in which it is called for. Yet, being able to act 
from this capacity is contingent on, first, the cultural horizon and 
understanding of morality of the life-worlds and language games in which 
one grows up and, secondly, on the care of parents and other significant 
others in introducing the child to this capacity. In his chapter on the 
foundations of morality, Forst remains largely quiet on this well known 
line of thought, which he knows only too well. 
 
A critical theory of transnational justice 
In the remainder of the first part of his book Forst dives deeper into the 
autonomy of his moral theory, fine-tunes the meaning of the difference 
between ethics and morality against the background of the right to 
justification; and relates his framework to that of his two great masters in 
Kantian moral theory: Habermas and Rawls. In the second part, he turns 
to the political and demonstrates how not just in moral theory, but in 
political theory as well the conception of a right to justification can 
ground our practical reasoning. In the third part of his book, he turns to 
human rights and transnational justice. Let me conclude my review with 
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a discussion of the final chapter of the book, in which Forst sketches the 
contours of what he calls a Critical Theory of transnational justice. 
Forst holds against the ‘etatists’ and the ‘globalists’ in the debate on 
transnational justice that they are locked in a fruitless discussion as to 
whether the problematic forms of cooperation and interdependence as 
circumstances of international (in)justice are to be understood as a 
responsibility for nation states or rather for the world-wide, global 
community. Forst asks them to change the subject and acknowledge that 
the problem is not mainly about who has the political power to shape 
cooperation and interdependencies, but about much more complex 
power relations that cannot be described in these terms of political 
influence at all. Forst argues as a true critical theorist where he states that 
focusing on immediate solutions for extreme poverty alone, for instance, 
is understandable yet ultimately unproductive. We rather have to 
understand the underlying structural injustices given with the power 
relationships that prevent a good ordering of transnational cooperation 
and interdependence – whether coordinated from many national or 
more centralized global perspectives. The question of power, Forst argues, 
is the first question of justice. (368) 
In the remainder of the chapter, Forst argues that just societal relations – 
both at the national and the global levels, as well as all other levels – can 
be reached only where a practice of justification, based in the moral right 
to justification, has come to life and taken form in legal, political and 
social institutions. Philosophers cannot determine how questions of 
distributive justice should be answered in detail. They can, however, give 
an argument for the right to justification, as Forst does. Where this right is 
respected, members of societies can decide for themselves what a just 
distribution of other goods would imply (375). 
At first sight, this may sound like a good strategy. But I think that it 
ultimately suffers from the problem that I touched upon earlier. Given 
the strict understanding of morality and moral motivation that Forst 
defends it remains unclear how the institutional and dispositional re-
quirements of his proposal are supposed to come into being in practice. 
Saying that the right to justification is fundamental or minimal in just 
association and that a just system of distribution of goods is to be seen as a 
‘maximal’ idea of justice that will flow from this sounds good in theory. In 
practice, however, a theory such as Forst’s is immediately confronted with 
the question of who is going to implement the just basic structure of 
justification world-wide and who will find reason to accept it. 
If we assume that we need a just basic structure that safeguards the right 
to justification before practices can become more just, then we end up in 
dead-ends such as those we see in Iraq. Basic rights to justification – as a 
basis for human rights – cannot be successfully imported into a ship-
wrecked social fabric. The relation between fundamental and maximal 
justice is much more complicated than that. The power relations that 
stand in the way of both minimal and maximal justice are not just those 
of a sovereign who suppresses his – in principle – Kantian subjects. 
Rather, the subjects have often been ‘subjectified’ into actors who sup-
ported the power relations that suppressed them. 
It is true that a good basic structure based on a right to justification may 
help such persons to develop a new and morally more promising sense of 
self. But many more ways towards that goal are thinkable, among which 
are more paternalistic strategies, like the re-education of citizens of 
Germany after the Second World War. People have to be educated in 
individualistic morality before we can expect them to make sense of a 
basic right to justification in Forst’s sense. Here, his idea about true moral 
motivation as based in moral recognition of the other seems overly 
demanding. It is much more likely that persons come to accept human 
rights and use them against their governments for self-interested reasons 
first. We don’t have to go far from home to see that point. The history of 
Western constitutional states suggests that the acceptance of the moral 
core of constitutions was not something that happened overnight, but 
rather something that came about gradually after more and more groups 
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of citizens discovered – some through a long struggle for rights, others 
through being granted such rights – that there was much to be won – 
instrumentally at first – by recognizing this moral core. People can fight 
for more just distributions even in societies where the right to justification 
of all citizens is not being respected at all. Our history illustrates this 
abundantly and claiming that the acceptance of a right to justification in 
and between individual states is the only way to fight subordination (377) 
simply seems incorrect. 
Every generation needs a great Kantian and Forst is a good one for mine! 
His is a downright impressive attempt at laying a moral foundation for 
our political thought. Its special virtue over other Kantian approaches to 
morality is its Critical Theoretical focus on a critique of power relations 
rather than a pure interest in right action. Still, as much as Forst tries to 
convince us that his account of morality gives persons sufficient practical 
ground for moral action, his approach remains at odds with historical 
realities and the strange multiplicity of normative strategies that have 
helped the human animal cope with the fact that our social world is not 
and cannot be governed by reasonable insight alone. 
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